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ARE THE U.K.’S PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS PROGRAMS
RIGHT FOR U.S. PRISONS?†
INTRODUCTION
The United States is the most incarcerated country in the world,1 whose most
recent population calculations reached over 1.5 million people behind bars in
2015.2 The price of housing for the world’s largest prison population to
American taxpayers is over $80 billion per year.3 By comparison, between 2016
and 2017 the United Kingdom only spent £2.9 billion, or $4.2 billion, housing
its average prison population of 84,705.4
Not only is the American prison system costly to taxpayers, it is also costly
to inmates. In a recent study it was found that 21% of male inmates had been
assaulted over a six-month period, either by their fellow inmates or prison staff.5
Sexual assault, in addition to other acts of violence, is also prevalent throughout
U.S. prisons.6 In 2011 alone, there were 8,763 allegations of sexual assault or
sexual victimization reported.7 Looking to other countries to determine if
punishment can be provided in a more cost-efficient way can improve the current
state of America’s criminal justice system.
To improve prison efficiency and performance, certain pro-incentive prison
reform advocates suggest that the criminal justice system should use
performance-based contracts to fund prisons based on reaching specific
performance measures or outcomes.8 Over the last decade, the use of
performance-based contracts has quickly spread to various countries across the

†
This Comment focuses on prison systems, therefore this Comment will refer to prisoners, inmates and
offenders interchangeably.
1
John Surico, How America Became the Most Imprisoned Nation in the World, VICE (Oct. 2015),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/avy474/america-incarcerated-0000765-v22n10.
2
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 250229, PRISONERS IN 2015 (Dec. 2016).
3
Peter Wagner and Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON POLICY
INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html.
4
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, COSTS PER PLACE AND COSTS PER PRISONER BY INDIVIDUAL PRISON, October 26,
2017 (U.K.).
5
Nancy Wolff and Jing Shi, Contextualization of Physical and Sexual Assault in Male Prisons: Incidents
and Their Aftermath, 15 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 58, 58 (Jan. 2, 2009).
6
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243904, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION
REPORTED BY ADULT CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2009–11 (Jan. 2014).
7
Id.
8
See Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Performance Measures, 63 EMORY L.J. 339 (2013).
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globe.9 Currently, “there are more than 70 projects in 18 countries, with 16
projects in the U.S.,” all featuring slightly different approaches to a
performance-based contract.10 The use of performance-based contracts in
prisons originated in the United Kingdom.11 Over the last decade, the United
Kingdom has successfully used a “payment-by-results” (PbR) program for
paying private prison contractors based on their ability to lower reconviction
rates (also referred to as recidivism rates) by certain percentage points in two of
its private prisons.12 Though payment-based contracts are being used across the
world, the United Kingdom’s use of PbR will be the focus of this Comment.
This Comment argues that the U.K.’s pilot private prison PbR programs, in
which they compensate prison contractors based on reductions in reconviction
rates, are appropriate for use in the U.S.’s federal and state prisons—both public
and private. To make this argument, this Comment will examine the effects of
the U.K.’s PbR programs in its prisons, health, and employment sectors; explore
the potential advantages and disadvantages of a PbR program; and directly apply
the U.K.’s PbR prison pilot programs to the federal and state governments in the
United States. To conclude, this Comment will argue that the two U.K. private
prison PbR pilot programs currently used by the United Kingdom can serve as
models for jurisdictions in the United States when designing their own PbR
programs, but that the United States cannot directly apply these models to all
state and federal prisons due to the need for PbR programs to be designed
specifically for the exact prison it is going to be implemented in.
Though this Comment will argue that the United Kingdom’s PbR programs
should not be used directly in the United States, designing and proscribing a
particular PbR model is outside the scope of this Comment due to the specificity
required for designing PbR programs. Instead, this Comment will explain certain
factors that jurisdictions in the United States should consider when determining
whether to implement PbR programs.
Part I of this Comment will provide background information on
incarceration and recidivism in both the United States and United Kingdom, and
background information on the U.K.’s use of PbR programs throughout its
9
See id.; Oklahoma approves first-ever Pay for Success contract addressing female incarceration, THE
NORMAN TRANSCRIPT (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.normantranscript.com/news/oklahoma-approves-first-everpay-for-success-contract-addressing-female/article_3005ca3e-1ef6-11e7-94b0-4f6fcb6a5f7b.html.
10
THE NORMAN TRANSCRIPT, supra note 9.
11
Id. at 2.
12
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL NOTICE, INTERIM RE-CONVICTION FIGURES FOR THE
PETERBOROUGH AND DONCASTER PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOTS, 1, 2013 (U.K.) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
NOTICE].
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government. Additionally, Part I will describe the U.K.’s PbR prison pilot
programs at Peterborough, Doncaster, and Leeds, and will touch on the growth
of PbR programs across the world. Subsequently, Part II will analyze the
advantages and disadvantages of PbR programs based on the research and results
from Peterborough and Doncaster. Part III will discuss the applicability of the
U.K.’s PbR prison pilots in U.S. federal and state prisons. To conclude, Parts IV
and V will address some potential criticisms of this proposition and draw
together some concluding thoughts.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS

A. Incarceration and Recidivism in the United States and United Kingdom
1. The United States
As previously mentioned, the United States houses the largest incarcerated
population in the world.13 At the end of 2015, the United States had an estimated
1,520,800 prisoners under the jurisdiction of state and federal correctional
authorities.14 Roughly 90% of these inmates are held in state prisons.15 The U.S.
prison population at the end of 2015 marked the lowest population since 2005
and represented a 2% decrease in the prison population from 2014.16 Even with
this decrease in prisoners, the U.S. prison population still greatly outnumbered
any other country’s prison population. This high prison population leads to high
costs of running and maintaining correctional facilities.17 The Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) reported that in 2012 total expenditures of corrections at all
levels of the government totaled $80.7 billion.18
Arguably, this high cost could be justified if the criminal justice system
successfully prepared inmates for life after release, but recidivism rates19 among
previously incarcerated individuals in the U.S. are high.20 After following

13

Surico, supra note 1.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 2.
15
Austill Stuart, New Zealand’s Recidivism-Focused Private Prison Contracts a Model for States, OUT
OF CONTROL POLICY BLOG (Sept. 21, 2017), http://reason.org/blog/show/new-zealand-recidivism-prison.
16
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 2.
17
Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 3.
18
Id.
19
Recidivism is defined as the “tendency to relapse into a previous condition or mode of behavior.”
Recidivism, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recidivism.
20
See Stuart, supra note 15.
14
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federal offenders for eight years post-release,21 a study found that out of “almost
one-half of federal offenders released in 2005, 49.3%, were arrested for a new
crime or rearrested for a violation of supervision conditions.”22 It is difficult to
gather data regarding state recidivism rates due to differences in state law and
the longitudinal nature of recidivism studies; however, it has been found that
“when excluding California, whose size skews the national picture, recidivism
rates between 1994 and 2007 have consistently remained around 40%.”23 More
recently, a 2014 BJS report across thirty states found that “about two-thirds
(67.8%) of released prisoners were arrested for a new crime within 3 years, and
three-quarters (76.6%) were arrested within 5 years.”24
State and federal government often contract out their incarceration facilities'
management to private prison companies.25 Governments seek bids from private
prison companies to establish a new private prison; once a private prison
company wins, it begins running the daily operations of the facility and assume
legal liability while being paid by the government.26 The use and origins of
private prisons started in the United States in 1983 with the founding of
Corrections Corporation of America.27 In 2015, the number of prisoners in
private prisons was just 8% of the total U.S. prison population28—“about
126,000 prisoners were held in privately operated facilities under the jurisdiction
of 29 states and the federal Bureau of Prisons.”29 This population represents an
8% decrease in private prison population since its peak in 2012.30

21
The United States Sentencing Commission began an eight-year longitudinal study in 2005 which
tracked 25,431 federal offenders in the community after being released from prison or on probation. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW (Mar. 2016).
22
Id.
23
PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS (Apr.
2011). See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 244205, RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005–2010 (Apr. 2014) [hereinafter 30 STATE
RECIDIVISM PATTERNS].
24
30 STATE RECIDIVISM PATTERNS, supra note 23.
25
Brett C. Burkhardt, Private prisons, explained, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 20, 2017), http://
theconversation.com/private-prisons-explained-73038.
26
Id.
27
Madison Pauly, A Brief History of America’s Private Prison Industry, MOTHER JONES (2016),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-prison-industry-timeline/.
28
Abigail Geiger, U.S. private prison population has declined in recent years, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/11/u-s-private-prison-population-has-declinedin-recent-years/.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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2. The United Kingdom
According to the most recent counts, the United Kingdom’s total prison
population stands at 86,256.31 In 2008, the cost of housing an inmate in the
United Kingdom is approximately £40,000 (or $51,012 in 2018 USD) per year.32
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) publishes proven reoffending statistics every
quarter, which represent the amount of people who have been reconvicted for
reoffending.33 According to the most recent statistics, “the overall proven
reoffending rate was 24.8%,” which is a decrease from the previous quarter.34
The United Kingdom began contracting with private prison companies in the
1990s.35 As of 2012, there were fourteen private prisons in the U.K.,36 which
made up 15% of the country’s prisons.37
B. The History and Development of Payment-by-Results Programs in the U.K.
Traditionally, social programs focus on the outputs of the program which are
“the tangible and intangible products that result from project activities,” such as
the number of people who are released from prison or who gain employment.38
Whereas PbR programs focus on outcomes that are “the benefits that a project
or intervention is designed to deliver,” such as reduced recidivism or lower
unemployment rates.39 A PbR system “allows the government to pay a service
provider on the basis of the outcomes their service achieves rather than the inputs
or outputs the provider delivers.”40 The theory behind PbR is that it will
encourage private prison providers “to focus on ends, not means, and is seen as
a means of promoting improvements in public services.”41 Advocates of PbR
31

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, POPULATION BULLETIN: WEEKLY 20 OCTOBER 2017 (U.K.).
Kevin Marsh, The real cost of prison, THE GUARDIAN (July 28, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2008/jul/28/justice.prisonsandprobation.
33
See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROVEN REOFFENDING STATISTICS QUARTERLY BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2014
TO SEPTEMBER 2015 (U.K.).
34
Marsh, supra note 32.
35
Private Prisons, POLITICS.CO.UK (2012), http://www.politics.co.uk/reference/private-prisons.
36
Id.
37
Sam Dean, Is this the end of private prisons?, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/business/2017/02/18/end-private-prisons/.
38
DEP’T OF INT’L DEV., INDICATORS OF INPUTS, ACTIVITIES, OUTPUTS, OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS IN
SECURITY AND JUSTICE PROGRAMMING, 6 (Oct. 15, 2013) (U.K.).
39
Id.
40
Kevin Albertson & Chris Fox, Payment by Results and Social Impact Bonds in the Criminal Justice
System Sector: New Challenges for the Concept of Evidence-based policy?, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 1 (2011).
41
Fraser Battye and Mike Daly, Payment by Results in public service reform: silver bullet, dangerous
weapon, neither, both?, 1 (July 2012), https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.247193!/file/C1_daly.pdf.
32

BROWN_COMMENTPROOFS

180

12/17/2018 12:44 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

claim it will lead to greater efficiency, more innovation, transfer of risk, and
encourage new market entrants42—a claim which will be discussed in more
detail in Part II.
The idea of PbR in the United Kingdom was first introduced into the
country’s National Health Service (NHS) in the early 2000s, when providers
were paid for the number and type of patients treated.43 One of the focuses of
the program was to “improve fairness and transparency of the payment
systems.”44 After several years of implementation, researchers at the King’s
Fund, a health charity, found that PbR in the NHS contributed to “rapid
reductions in lengths of stay,” compared to Scotland where PbR was not
implemented as a control.45 Additionally, the researchers noted that there was
little evidence that PbR had a negative impact on quality of the health services
and that the ability to earn extra payments was not being used.46
In June 2011, the U.K. implemented another PbR program, the Work
Programme, which paid contractors and employers based on their ability to hire
and maintain employment of those who were previously classified as “long-term
unemployed.”47 This program began “with the primary aim of helping the longterm unemployed back into work for [sustainable] periods of time.”48 People
who had been out of the work force between nine and twelve months were
referred to the program and assigned to different groups based on personal
characteristics.49 Later, contractors or employers were paid based on their ability
to provide sustained employment for participants of the program.50 After three
years, the Work Programme was able to refer 1.6 million people, and 687,000
people were able to maintain employment for two years, thereby saving the
government £21 million by “extrapolating invalid job outcome payments and
reducing payments to prime contractors accordingly.”51 Though the Work
Programme experienced some success, a majority of the participants were

42

Albertson & Fox, supra note 40, at 4–7.
Id. at 4.
44
Id.
45
John Appleby, Tony Harrison, Loraine Hawkins & Anna Dixon, Payment by Results: How can
payment systems help deliver better care?, THE KING’S FUND (2012).
46
Id.
47
Case Study: The UK’s Work Programme for the unemployed, Centre for Public Impact (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/uk-work-programme/ [hereinafter Centre for Public Impact].
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, THE WORK PROGRAMME, 2014–2015, HC 266, at 4 (U.K.).
43
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unable to find sustained employment.52
C. The State of Implementation of Prison PbR Programs in the United
Kingdom
After seeing the results of PbR in health services, a Green Paper53 was
published in 2010 in which the MOJ committed to starting a number of PbR
pilot programs in several of their prisons.54 After the Green Paper, two pilot
programs were started, each of which used different types of PbR programs.55
The first pilot program took place at Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Peterborough
and began on September 9, 2010.56 The second pilot program was implemented
over a year later on October 1, 2011 at HMP Doncaster.57 Both pilot programs
focused on reducing reoffending rates as their measure of success.58 A third pilot
program that focused on reducing reconviction rates was also slated to take place
at HMP Leeds, one of the country’s publicly-run facilities; it was later cancelled
due to market failure.59 While the two pilot programs that ran used different PbR
programs, the MOJ determined their results by using a “12-month re-conviction
measure, which counts offenses committed in the 12 months following release
from prison, and resulting in conviction at court either in those 12 months or in
a further 6-month period (allowing time for cases to progress through the
courts).”60 A more in-depth analysis of each prison and its PbR pilot program
follows.
1. HMP Peterborough
HMP Peterborough, which began its PbR pilot program in 2010, uses a
social impact bond to finance the program.61 A Social Impact Bond is “a public52

Centre for Public Impact, supra note 47.
A Green Paper in the United Kingdom is “a preliminary report of government proposals that is
published in order to provoke discussion.” Green Paper, OXFORDDICTIONARIES.COM, https://en.
oxforddictionaries.com/definition/green_paper.
54
STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 13, at 1.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HMP DONCASTER PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOT: FINAL PROCESS EVALUATION
REPORT, 2015 (U.K.) [hereinafter DONCASTER FINAL EVALUATION REPORT].
58
Ministry of Justice, Payment by results prison pilot continues to show falls in reoffending, Gov.UK
(2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/payment-by-results-prison-pilot-continues-to-show-falls-inreoffending.
59
Max Chambers, Expanding Payment-by-Results, POLICY EXCHANGE (2013).
60
STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12 at 1.
61
Jake Anders and Richard Dorsett, A review of the matching process for the impact analysis of the HMP
53
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private partnership where one or more investor(s) provide upfront capital for the
realization of public projects that generate verifiable social and/or environmental
outcomes.”62 Typically under a Social Impact Bond, the government contracts
out to an intermediary who will raise the capital for the project from investors
and find a service provider to deliver the outcomes.63 If the project achieves the
desired outcomes, the Government pays the intermediary and the investors.64 If
the project fails, the investors will lose out on their investment.65 The Social
Impact Bond at Peterborough was coordinated by Social Finance, a nonprofit
organization that raised capital from private investors for the pilot.66 The MOJ
and the Big Lottery Fund agreed to pay back these investors with interest
“ranging from 2.5% to 13%”67 if the pilot “reduced reoffending by 7.5%
overall.”68
In an attempt to reduce reconviction rates, the pilot implemented the One
Service program, funded by the Social Impact Bond.69 The One Service program
provided for “no fixed intervention model or single theory of change,” and
therefore allowed for a mix of activities to be individually proscribed to each
offender based on their specific needs as determined by caseworkers.70 Contact
with cohort members of the pilot was made before release and continued for up
to twelve months after release.71 To determine what each offender needed to
reduce their risk of reoffending, “a needs assessment was developed with
providers and local specialist agencies.”72 The One Service program was
delivered by “voluntary and community sector providers,” who were
compensated for their work.73 Some of the staff members and volunteers who
directly dealt with the prisoners in the program were prior offenders, which
proved useful in engaging the offenders in the program.74 The success of the
Peterborough Social Impact Bond, NAT’L INST. OF ECON. AND SOC. RES. (June, 2017).
62
Social and Development Impact Bonds (Results-Based Financing), UNDP, http://www.undp.org/
content/sdfinance/en/home/solutions/social-development-impact-bonds.html.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61.
67
Social and Development Impact Bonds, supra note 62.
68
Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61.
69
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PHASE 2 REPORT FROM THE PAYMENT BY RESULTS SOCIAL IMPACT BOND PILOT
AT HMP PETERBOROUGH, 2014, at 1 (U.K.) [hereinafter PETERBOROUGH PHASE 2 REPORT].
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 3.
73
Id. at 1.
74
Id. at 4.
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One Service program can be linked to its ability to take into account local context
when trying to solve a “locally defined problem.”75 Additionally, the program
served as a gap filler between existing programs and offered hands-on support
for offenders.76
Throughout the pilot program, the MOJ published both interim and final
results.77 The final results of the Peterborough pilot looked at the “frequency of
re-conviction events, based on offenses committed within 12 months of release
from prison and conviction at court within those 12 month or a further 6 month
period.”78 The interim results were based on periods half the length of those used
in the final results.79 Peterborough’s success was determined by a comparison
of a “control group of comparable offenders from across the country.”80 Halfway
through the pilot there was a 6% “fall in the frequency of re-conviction events
at Peterborough while nationally there [was] a substantial rise.”81 At the end of
the pilot, across the two cohorts that were measured, there was an estimated fall
in the frequency of reconviction events of 9%, thereby triggering the outcome
payment, allowing the Social Impact Bond investors to receive their money from
the government.82
2. HMP Doncaster
HMP Doncaster is a private prison which, under the PbR contract, was
managed by the private public services company, Serco, alongside two
community organizations, Catch 22 and Turning.83 The aim of the pilot was to
reduce recidivism.84 Under the PbR contract, if Serco reduced the reconviction
rate by 5%, it would retain the full contract value. If they reduced the
reconviction rate by more than 5%, it would trigger additional outcome
payments.85

75

Id.
Id. at 5.
77
See STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12; DONCASTER FINAL EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 58.
78
STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12, at 2.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 3.
81
Id. at 5.
82
Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61.
83
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
HMP DONCASTER PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOT 1, 3 (Nov. 2012) (U.K.) [hereinafter FINDINGS FROM DONCASTER
PILOT].
84
Id. at i.
85
Id. at 4.
76
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To reduce reconviction rates, the key feature of the Doncaster pilot was its
use of an Alliance model between the three aforementioned parties.86 One of the
main changes the managers introduced in Doncaster was the implementation of
community resettlement support and case management.87 Upon arrival to
Doncaster, cohort members were assigned a case manager.88 The case manager
went through the MegaNexus needs assessment with the prisoner and provided
a support plan based on the results.89 MegaNexus is an electronic case
management system used by Doncaster to track management data.90 Rather than
deliver services directly, the case manager would simply provide access to
interventions and services recommended by the support plan.91 No new
interventions were put into place after the start of the PbR pilot.92 Another facet
of the pilot program was that Serco would be responsible for accredited
programs, while Catch 22 dealt with case management.93
The MOJ also published interim and final results throughout the pilot for
Doncaster as it did for the Peterborough pilot.94 The final results of the Doncaster
pilot were based on “the proportion of offenders who commit one or more
offences in the 12 months following release from prison and are convicted at
court in those 12 months or in a further 6 months.”95 The interim results at
Doncaster were also based on periods half the length of those used in the final
results.96 The success of Doncaster was determined by comparing the results
with the baseline reconviction rate that was calculated from the 2009 calendar
year.97 Halfway through the pilot, the re-conviction frequency at Doncaster fell
by 4.9% compared to the baseline year.98 At the end of the Doncaster pilot, the
reconviction rate fell 3.3% as compared to the baseline year, did not meet the
5% threshold, and therefore did not trigger the outcome payment.99

86

Id. at i.
Id. at ii.
88
Id. at 12.
89
Id. at 15.
90
Id..
91
Id. at 18–19.
92
Id. at 19.
93
Id. at ii.
94
See STATISTICAL NOTICE, supra note 12.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 2.
98
Id. at 6.
99
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, HMP DONCASTER: PAYMENT BY RESULTS PILOT, FINAL RE-CONVICTION
RESULTS FOR COHORT 1, 2 (July 2015) (U.K.) [hereinafter DONCASTER COHORT 2 FINAL RESULTS].
87
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3. HMP Leeds
HMP Leeds was slated to be the first ever public prison to be funded using
a PbR program.100 In 2012, the MOJ began the procurement process and later
closed the competition because only one of six potential providers decided to
pursue the prison contract.101 The Leeds model was supposed to involve a
“public/private partnership, where a new joint venture would be set up and
services jointly run, with risk transferred to the private sector.”102 Though the
Leeds pilot program did not come to fruition due to market failure,103 its proposal
stands for the proposition that PbR programs can and should be considered for
use in both public and private institutions.
Overall, the two completed prison PbR pilot programs at Peterborough and
Doncaster have shown some successes. Though both Peterborough and
Doncaster were able to reduce reconviction rates, Doncaster was unable to meet
the desired threshold to trigger the final outcome payment.104 Additionally,
despite both pilots having used the same performance measure of reducing
reconviction rates, comparing the two pilots is difficult as they both employed
different models and used different methods within the prisons themselves to
achieve their goals.
In 2015, the National Audit Office (NAO) released a report discussing the
government’s use of PbR throughout its various departments.105 Based on the
United Kingdom’s use of PbR, the NAO found that PbR contracts are “a
technically challenging form of contracting and [have] attendant costs and risks
that the government has often underestimated.”106 One such cost is that the
commissioner must expend time and resources to monitor and manage the
contractor to ensure they are achieving their outcomes.107 Additionally, if the
contractor is failing to meet their outcomes the commissioner may have to step
in and assist.108 Due to this, the NAO suggested that when the government is

100
Joe Inwood, State-run Leeds Prison to be paid on results, BBC (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-england-leeds-15479570.
101
NAT’L AUDIT OFFICE, OUTCOME-BASED PAYMENT SCHEMES: GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PAYMENT BY
RESULTS, 2015–16 HC 86, at 27 (U.K.) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PAYMENT BY RESULTS].
102
Chambers, supra note 59.
103
Id. at 14–15.
104
DONCASTER COHORT 2 FINAL RESULTS, supra note 99.
105
GOVERNMENT’S USE OF PAYMENT BY RESULTS, supra note 101.
106
Id. at 7.
107
Id. at 8.
108
Id.
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determining whether to choose PbR in the future, the “commissioners should
justify their selection of PbR over alternative delivery mechanisms” because of
the costs and the fact that “PbR is not suited to all public services.”109 NAO
suggested that governments need to “actively monitor and manage provider
performance,” which the U.K. has failed to do.110 The government has also failed
to collect data about the effects of PbR across the various departments in which
programs had been implemented.111
D. The Growth of Payment-by-Results and Similar Programs in Prisons
Across the World
In the last decade, there has been an increase in the use and implementation
of PbR programs in prisons around the world.112 Many of these projects are still
in the beginning phases, and therefore published results are not available for
analysis in this Comment. Though the following PbR programs take place
outside of the U.K., these projects are worth mentioning because they
demonstrate the idea that PbR design is dependent on context and local needs
and that PbR is worth exploring in the United States.
New Zealand’s government began experimenting with PbR in 2015 when it
allowed a consortium led by Serco to build and operate the Auckland South
Correctional Facility (Wiri).113 The consortium has been tasked with lowering
recidivism rates by 10% with a special focus on reducing recidivism among
indigenous inmates.114 In addition to receiving payments if the consortium
lowers recidivism rates, they will also receive incentive payments if their facility
out-performs state facilities.115 On the other hand, if there is a security incident,
or a serious breach occurs, the consortium’s payments are reduced, or they may
be responsible for paying a penalty.116 The New Zealand government preferred
this model because it encouraged the manager of the prison to create change that
could lead to better outcomes both inside and outside of the prison.117 A
noteworthy aspect of this project is that the consortium was able to build and
109
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design Wiri in a way that allowed them to increase incentives for inmates to
behave, and thereby reduced recidivism rates.118 Initial results from Wiri should
be soon forthcoming and are worth analyzing in the contemplation and design
of a PbR program in the Unites States.
In December 2016, the Australian government opened a new women’s
prison called Melaleuca,119 which is run by Sodexo.120 In Melaleuca, Sodexo
will be employing support programs to help prevent inmates from reoffending
once released.121 For compensation, Sodexo will receive a payment of $11,000
(15,000 Australian dollars) “for every convict who does not return within two
years” from the Australian government.122
The use of PbR has also made its way to the United States where there are
sixteen PbR, or pay for success (PFS)123, programs currently running.124 In
Oklahoma, a PbR system was put into effect in early 2017 at women’s facilities
in which the government contracted with the nonprofit organization Women in
Recovery (WIR) to run a diversion/reentry program.125 Oklahoma contracted
with WIR with the purpose of WIR delivering these intensive reentry programs
in public women’s facilities in Tulsa.126 The nonprofit will receive payments for
each successful graduate of the program.127 WIR predicts it will be able to admit
“125 women into the program annually for up to five years.”128
Another effort was made in 2013 in Pennsylvania where the state was able
to renegotiate “all contracts governing its 38 community correction centers” to
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tie performance and payment to recidivism rates.129 In the second year of the
program, the forty-two community correction centers, or halfway houses, were
able to reduce recidivism rates by 11.3%, marking two years of decreases by
preparing residents to re-enter society after being released from prison.130
II. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS
PROGRAM
A. Advantages
There are many potential advantages of employing a PbR program, some of
which include: efficiency and resource distribution, experimentation, and
market participation.131
Scholars argue that PbR leads to greater efficiency by correcting “misaligned
incentives.”132 The “principal mechanism underpinning PbR” is changing
incentives by addressing the “principal-agent problem by aligning interests and
incentives around the achievement of an outcome that both parties regard as
desirable.”133 In the case of prisons, this could include: reducing recidivism,134
overcrowding,135 assaults,136 escapes,137 and improving health care.138 In a
normal service provider situation, the provider often does not take part in the
benefit of that activity, but PbR allows for service providers to benefit from their
actions by receiving a payment.139 Incentives will also be realigned due to the
entrance of new market participants.140 As described below, service providers
will have a greater incentive to perform and focus on outcomes to stay in
business.141 PbR programs also allow resources to be disbursed where they will
have the most benefit.142 For example, rather than putting resources towards
129
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more security guards, money could be put towards preventative measures, job
training, or counseling services in order to improve outcomes.143
Another advantage of a PbR program is that it can lead to experimentation.
By focusing on outcomes rather than inputs and outputs, PbR programs allow
providers to find innovative solutions to reach their goals or performance
measures.144 PbR does this by telling providers what needs to be done, rather
than how they need to do it, thereby giving the provider an opportunity to
experiment to achieve their goals.145 This advantage was demonstrated in the
Peterborough pilot where the contract did not specify what needed to be done to
improve outcomes.146 This resulted in the successful One Service program that
was crafted based on local knowledge and context.147 Also, the government
transfers the risk of experimenting to reach the performance measurements away
from themselves and onto the providers by partaking in contracts.148
Another purported advantage of a PbR program is that experimentation in
service delivery will lead to the entry of new market participants and diverse
service providers.149 Implementing a PbR program could allow for private and
nonprofit organizations to come in and break up the public sector monopoly on
a given service.150 Having multiple service providers could increase competition
in the sector, and create competitive pressure among the market participants to
perform and find effective means of achieving outcomes.151 Providers who do
not perform will be replaced by those who are able to deliver favorable
outcomes.152 This advantage of a PbR program is minimal because new market
entry is already possible under the traditional privatization model.153
Additionally, scholars argue that a PbR program could deter new market entry
of small or nonprofit providers because they may be more sensitive to the risks
associated with a PbR contract.154 Though small corporations and nonprofits
may not be parties to a PbR contract due to financial constraints, the major
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corporations could still tap nonprofits for help with delivering services to help
achieve their outcomes.155
Additional advantages of PbR programs include cost-effectiveness,156 risk
transfer from commissioner to service provider,157 user responsiveness,158 and
accountability.159
B. Disadvantages
Inherent in a PbR program are several disadvantages which involve the
designing and implementation of the program itself and the effects on provider
behavior.160
One of the largest disadvantages to a PbR program is the difficulty of
defining outcomes, or targets, that are measurably close to the desired end
result.161 Outcomes should be clear, measurable, and aligned with the
government’s policy objectives to ensure that the government can track
performance, and that the provider is meeting their objectives.162 To set
performance goals, the commissioner or government must determine the
baseline, or non-intervention rate, in the sector based on quantitative data on that
specific outcome.163 Setting performance goals may be challenging depending
on the sector, but once the baseline is calculated, the commissioner or
government should set performance goals above the non-intervention rate.164
When dealing with the criminal justice system, it may be difficult to value
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outcomes, such as lowered crime rates or reconviction rates.165 However,
controlling for baselines may not be crucial “for a compensation scheme to
provide the proper incentives for improvement” if PbR contracts are allocated
by auction because it would result in the same price to the contractor and
government.166
Further, the implementation of PbR programs results in higher transaction
costs.167 Due to the fact-specific nature of designing PbR programs, designing
an appropriate program for every prison where the government may want to
implement a program would be expensive and somewhat tedious.168 Also, PbR
programs result in increased costs when considering factors such as monitoring
and paying providers and setting up and commissioning a PbR contract.169
Measuring the impact itself may also prove challenging.170 Monitoring the
provider’s performance requires the development and maintenance of a system
to track the progress of the program both inside and outside of the prison.171 The
PbR programs at Doncaster and Peterborough “were hampered because [the]
MOJ had not established effective data sharing between its prison and probation
systems and the police national computer when piloting began.”172 Additionally,
regarding reconviction data, impact and data can be affected by outside factors,
“such as police clear-up rates and the time taken to finalize cases.”173
Another disadvantage of implementing a PbR program is that it could result
in “undesirable strategic behavior” by the provider.174 By focusing on outcomes,
PbR programs could create incentives for providers to cherry-pick, or “target
people most likely to achieve a result, rather than those most in need.”175 Cherrypicking can be avoided by not allowing contractors to have a choice in what
inmates they are given.176 In the Social Impact Bond pilot at Peterborough, the
MOJ determined that there was no evidence of cherry-picking within its One
165
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Service program to help those who have a better chance of achieving better
outcomes.177 Additionally, concerns over undesirable strategic behavior are not
serious enough to stop experimenting with PbR.178
The use of targets or performance measures could also lead to myopia, in
which providers focus on “short-term gain to yield quick returns, leaving longterm issues to build up.”179 By allowing providers to be a part of the contracting
process and crafting the performance measures, they could easily manipulate the
goals or choose easily achievable goals.180 In choosing the performance
measures, they may focus on “measurable dimensions” rather than
unmeasurable ones.181 A simple solution to this problem would be not to allow
contractors to be part of setting the goals, and instead leave it to the “relevant
contracting authority.”182 Setting targets which result in payment of the contract,
or incentive payments, could also result in convergence where providers work
towards “a standard level of performance rather than excellence.”183 Some
scholars even argue that using a PbR program may encourage falsifying records
to ensure targets are met.184 This strategic behavior may be linked, as previously
mentioned, to the fact that PbR programs transfer the risk of experimentation to
the providers who may feel pressure to act strategically to avoid major losses.185
III. DISCUSSION ON PAYMENT-BY-RESULTS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE U.S.
The U.K.’s PbR prison pilot programs provide two models to consider when
determining what is appropriate for implementation in the United States. In
making such a determination, it is important to look at: the evidence from both
pilot programs; their applicability to the United States on the federal level; their
applicability to the United States on the state level; and current U.S. private
prison contracts.
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A. Evidence from Peterborough and Doncaster
The two PbR pilot programs in the United Kingdom began after 2010.186
Due to its recent implementation and the government’s inability to run a pilot
program at the Leeds public prison, the United Kingdom’s use of PbR in private
and public prisons has not been fully tested.187 This recent implementation, and
use of different models in the prisons, have not provided the United States with
one reliable model that can be transplanted into the U.S. prison system.
Both of the pilot programs at Peterborough and Doncaster showed some
success in reducing the reconviction rate for cohort members.188 At the end of
the Peterborough pilot, there was a 9% decrease in reconviction rates, which
triggered the income payment.189 At Doncaster, the pilot was able to reduce
reconviction rates by 3.3% which ultimately did not trigger the outcome
payment.190 These statistics may not be accurate, as evidenced by the finding of
the NAO in its 2015 report that the MOJ had not been collecting evidence and
data of its PbR programs.191 Though only one program triggered the outcome
payment, they were both able to reduce reconviction rates, which was the
ultimate goal of the pilots.192 Since both pilots documented a reduction in
reconviction rates due to the incentives given to the service providers, both pilots
can serve as models for the United States to use when implementing their own
PbR programs. The United States should continue to monitor studies coming
from these two pilot programs as well as those mentioned in other parts of the
world.
B. The U.K.’s Payment-by-Results Programs Applicability to the U.S. State
and Federal Governments
As found by the NAO, PbR programs are difficult and costly to design.193
Additionally, PbR programs are not a one-size-fits-all approach, and each
program has to be carefully crafted to fit its context.194 There are a number of
factors to consider when determining whether a PbR model should be used in
186
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188
189
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the United States, some of which include: scale of change, defining outcomes,
measuring impact, and fiscal benefits.195 Designing a program that meets the
context’s needs is imperative to determine whether a PbR program is right for
the United States.196 Variables for developing a proper program include: “(1) the
level at which results are specified, (2) the extent to which payment is based
solely on outcomes, or whether a blend of outputs and outcomes are used, (3)
the significance of PbR within the contract, and (4) at what level PbR is
structured to alter incentives at the level of a system.”197 To determine if either
of the U.K. pilot programs are applicable to U.S. state and federal prisons, this
Comment will directly apply them to the U.S. context in which there are 102
federal prisons and 1,719 state prisons.198
The Peterborough pilot used an Social Impact Bond to fund its One Service
program, which brought together community members to help define and solve
the community problem of reoffending.199 To implement the One Service
program, Social Finance paid the aforementioned community service providers
to help offenders before and after release in an attempt to reduce their chance of
reoffending.200 Implementing such a program at the federal level in the United
States would be challenging, more so than at the state level, but is feasible. First,
due to the philanthropic culture of the United States there would be a myriad of
opportunities for funding an Social Impact Bond.201 There have been several
PbR programs across the United States involving various social issues that have
been able to find impact-seeking capital from investors to fund their various
programs.202 For example, the first Social Impact Bond in the United States at
New York Rikers Island jail was funded by an investment from Bloomberg
Philanthropies and Goldman Sachs, which was protected by a philanthropy.203
In 2017, Americans donated approximately $410.02 billion to charities.204
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Additionally, the United States was found to be the most generous nation in the
world when comparing the “rate of charitable donations as a percentage [of]
gross domestic product.”205 Secondly, in the United States, service providers at
each state and federal prison chosen to run a PbR program would replicate the
local focus of the Peterborough pilot by bringing in local actors and
organizations to help solve and define the problems in their community.
The Doncaster pilot, on the other hand, used an alliance model to improve
case management for cohort members before and after release.206 Throughout
the pilot, case managers only facilitated access to interventions, rather than fully
supplying interventions to offenders, which did not ensure that offenders would
take advantage of them.207 Though case managers did not fully supply
interventions to every offender,208 and the program did not trigger the outcome
payment, the pilot was still able to lower reconviction rates.209 Learning from
the experiences at Doncaster, service providers chosen to run a PbR program in
a federal prison could ensure that more resources are allocated to case managers
to effectively run the alliance model.
Though the federal government has not yet implemented a PbR program,
several states have already began exploring PbR in their prisons.210 Building of
the models at Peterborough and Doncaster, in addition to developing their own
models, states can contribute to experimentation advantage of PbR programs
more readily than the federal government.
Neither the Peterborough nor the Doncaster pilot programs are wholly
appropriate for U.S. state or federal prisons due to the context driven nature of
designing a PbR program. Nonetheless, both programs can serve as models for
the federal government to learn from and improve upon when implementing
potential PbR programs in federal prisons. Further, allowing states to take the
lead on conducting PbR pilots would allow the federal government to draw from
those experiences when designing their own PbR programs. However, that
should not prevent the federal government from acting now.
205
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C. Current U.S. Private Prison Contracts
A major legal obstacle to implementing PbR programs in U.S. private
prisons is determining whether it is possible to implement a PbR program under
current private prison contracts, or if the government would have to wait until
renewal negotiations. To determine the answer to this question, the parties to the
contract would need to look at the specific contract language regarding
amendments, and follow those procedures therein.211 Traditionally, if the terms
of a contract are to be changed, the parties must draft an amendment on which
they mutually agree, which then merges and becomes a part of the original
contract upon signing.212 Though private prison companies can be incentivized
to improve through performance measures, making them agree to terms that
make it harder for them to earn a profit before the end of their current contract
will be a hard obstacle to overcome. It is more likely that the parties will wait
until it is time to renew the contract to add a PbR program into the agreement.
Amending contracts would not be a hurdle for implementing a PbR program in
publicly run facilities, which is another argument for increasing the use of PbR
programs in the public sector.
D. Other Practical Issues
In addition to the difficulty of amending current private prison contracts,
another issue to keep in mind when discussing the implementation of a PbR
program in private prisons on the federal level is the recent reversal of private
prison policy. In August 2016, the Department of Justice released a
memorandum stating that it would reduce the amount of private prison contracts
held by the Bureau of Prisons.213 In the memorandum, Deputy Attorney General
Sally Yates cited the fact that private prisons do not substantially save on costs
and do not provide the same level of services as federally run facilities as reasons
for bringing an end to federal private prisons.214 This Obama era policy was
quickly changed by the Trump Administration in February 2017 when Attorney
General Jeff Sessions released a memorandum rescinding the previous
administration’s “Reducing our Use of Private Prisons” memorandum.215 In the
211
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memorandum, Sessions claims ending the use of private prisons “impaired the
Bureau’s ability to meet the future needs of the federal correctional system.”216
Since the federal government is once again embracing the use of private prisons
and the discussion of PbR in federal private prisons should continue.
In addition to the fluctuating policies at the federal level, there have been
some changes in opinion among the states regarding private prisons. In 2017,
there was a movement away from private prisons among the states in three major
cities, New York City, Philadelphia and Portland, and in universities divesting
from private prison companies.217 This movement away from private prisons
among states does not preclude the implementation of PbR programs.
Performance-based compensation in public prisons is also a feasible idea,218 as
evidenced by the PbR program in Oklahoma219 and the cancelled PbR pilot at
Leeds.220 Additionally, there has been a movement in the United States towards
merit-based pay and promotions in various areas of the public sector, such as
merit-based pay for teachers, which could be translated to prisons.221
Further, throughout the United States, there is the belief that the government,
rather than for-profit businesses, should be administering justice.222 However,
there are counterarguments against this point of view that claim there is no
inherent, or relevant, difference between private or publicly managed
services.223 Alexander Volokh argues that the non-empirical arguments against
privatization, such as the argument that states should provide certain services,
are not relevant to the “employee-contractor distinction.”224 Volokh further
argues that the distinction between employees and contractors is an
administrative one, and that “contracting out is merely a retreat of state
employment in favor of other forms of state contracting.”225 Also, many believe
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that allowing for-profit businesses to take part in administering justice
encourages them to not reduce reconviction rates, but to encourage the growth
of mass incarceration to ensure they make a profit.226 This argument against
private prisons depends entirely on how the compensation is structured. If the
compensation is structured on the number of beds filled in the prison, then it is
arguable that private prison companies would partake in undesirable strategic
behavior to obtain high profits. A PbR compensation method on the other hand
rewards private prison companies for reducing reconviction rates or achieving
various other outcomes. Finally, though many people dislike the thought of
contracting out to private prison companies, this argument should not prevent
the implementation of PbR programs in public prisons.
IV. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS
There are several potential criticisms that suggest the U.K.’s PbR prison pilot
programs should not be implemented at the federal or state levels in the United
States.
First, the PbR pilot prison program at Peterborough and Doncaster did not
produce enough successful results to suggest either should be implemented in
the United States. Out of the two pilot programs in the U.K., only one pilot was
successful enough to trigger the outcome payment.227 Also, even though both
prison pilots and the other PbR health and employment programs implemented
in the U.K. demonstrated some successes,228 they are arguably not the right fit
for or ready to be implemented in the United States. While only Peterborough
triggered the outcome payment, both programs were able to reduce reconviction
rates.229 Though the use of PbR in the area of corrections is new, the successes
of PbR programs across the world suggest that incentives are effective when
trying to reduce recidivism. Moreover, the U.S. federal and state governments
should learn from the successes and failures of the Peterborough and Doncaster
models when using them to implement PbR programs in the United States.
Second, the type of outcome measures used in the PbR prison pilot programs
are not appropriate for the United States. The U.K. PbR programs used a
reduction in reconviction rates as their only outcome measure, when various
other measures like violence, health care or overcrowding could have been
226
227
228
229

Margulies, supra note 222.
See Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61.
See Centre for Public Impact, supra note 47; Appleby, Harrison, Hawkins, & Dixon, supra note 45.
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used.230 Additionally, the PbR contracts used an “intermediate reward scheme,”
which combined discrete231 and continuous232 measures where the payment of
the contract did not start until it reached the desired reduction of reconviction
rates, and continued for every percentage point the reconviction rate decreased
until it hit the cap.233 The use of discrete or binary measures can result in
providers having little incentive to achieve higher than the set target which can
be avoided through the use of continuous measures.234 While the use of only one
somewhat discrete outcome measure in the U.K. PbR pilot programs is
problematic, that does not prevent federal or state governments from taking the
U.K.’s programs and building upon them by adding in additional outcome
measures and compensation schemes.
CONCLUSIONS
A PbR program’s potential for improving outcomes in the criminal justice
system is worth exploring in the United States, but it is important that the
proscribed model is designed specifically for the U.S. and the specific prison in
which it will be implemented. The two U.K. PbR pilot programs at Peterborough
and Doncaster resulted in reduced reconviction rates, though only one program
trigged the outcome payment.235 Consequently, these results, and the
implementation of PbR programs in the United States and across the world
suggest that the PbR programs used at Peterborough and Doncaster should serve
as inspirations for the United States in designing their own PbR programs
because any reduction in reconviction rates is beneficial.
Though only one outcome measure, recidivism, was used in the U.K. pilot
programs, that does not preclude the federal or state governments from
introducing additional outcome measures like health care, prison violence, and

230
See generally MTC INST., supra note 135 (This article discusses a number of outcomes other than
recidivism that can be measured to pay outcome payments off of.)
231
Discrete or binary outcome measures are those in which payment is dependent upon whether the
provider does or does not hit the desired outcome. They are often easier to implement into PbR contracts than
continuous measures. See JAMES DICKER, 2020 PUB. SERVS. TRUST AT THE RSA, CASE STUDY 2, PAYMENT-BYOUTCOME IN OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 16 (2011).
232
Continuous or distance travelled measures are those in which payment is awarded based on the
providers progress in reaching the desired outcome. Continuous measures are less risky for the service provider
as compared to the discrete measures. Volokh, supra note 8, at 382–83.
233
Id. at 383.
234
Id. at 382–84.
235
Anders & Dorsett, supra note 61; DONCASTER COHORT 2 FINAL RESULTS, supra note 101.
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cost savings into the contract.236 This has already been seen in New Zealand,
where New Zealand’s government is using the outcome measures of death and
prison violence in calculating payments or deductions on the contract.237
Additionally, federal and state governments in the United States could build on
the U.K.’s intermediate reward scheme combining both discrete and continuous
measures. This would allow them to move towards an increased use of
continuous measures which could allow more risk-adverse smaller corporations
and nonprofits to get involved in PbR contracts. It would also incentivize
providers to go above and beyond certain targets to achieve higher payments.
With the myriad of PbR programs being implemented in the United States
and abroad, the first step the federal government should take is to create a task
force within the Department of Justice. This group would be tasked with
monitoring the PbR programs currently taking place. Though these programs are
relatively new, the U.S. can monitor them for success while crafting their own
PbR program. The task force would also be responsible for comparing and
contrasting the various models to determine which performance measures would
best suit the needs of federal prisons. After choosing the appropriate
performance measures and determining which goals they would want the
providers to focus on, the task force should choose a federal prison in which to
implement their pilot program and analyze what specific programs and resources
would most benefit that particular location. Such task force would allow for the
federal government to benefit from the experimentation among the states and
the world, while also ensuring a federal PbR program is contextually designed.
States and the federal government could also work with incentive advocacy
groups like Instiglio238 to design and implement PbR programs in their public
and private prisons.
In conclusion, the prison PbR pilot programs at Peterborough and Doncaster
can serve as excellent models for the U.S. federal and state governments to use
when designing and implementing their own PbR programs, but they cannot be
directly transferred to the United States due to the need to design a PbR programs
under a U.S.-specific context. The lessons learned from Peterborough,
Doncaster, and other PbR programs around the world will allow the United
States to develop their own PbR programs to meet their unique needs while
alleviating some of the issues that are currently running rampant in the U.S.
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See Volokh, supra note 181.
Rani, supra note 113; Stuart, supra note 15.
INSTIGLIO, http://www.instiglio.org/en/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
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criminal justice system, such as overcrowding, recidivism, violence, and high
costs.
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